Link Project Case Study

Themanagementofinformationandcommunicationtechnologyenabled(ICT-enabled)projects atthestate,nationalandinternationallevel,inboththeprivateandpublicsectors,hasbeenthe subject of considerable research and debate over recent years. The consensus is that these projectsareoftenpoorlymanagedandfailuresarecommon.

ICTsystemsstoreandcommunicateinformationaboutgovernmentbusinessandinmanycases areusedtoadministerfrontlineservicestothepublic.Despitethis,manygovernmentICTsystems aredatedandlacktherequiredfunctionality.

Crime statistics are one measure the community uses to judge our relative safety and security. Theyshowtherateofrecordedcrimeacrosslocalgovernmentareasorregions,andcanhighlight trendssuchasincreasesordecreasesintypesofcrimesandhowandwheretheyarecommitted. The government uses crime statistics as an indicator of the effectiveness of criminal justice policies,andVictoriaPoliceusescrimestatisticstohelpdetermineitsresourcingneeds.

VictoriaPolicecollects,reviewsandrecordsinformationoncrimes—andthevictimsandallegedoffenders involved—in its Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP) database. It is essentially an online database fully relational that stores information about all crimes brought to the notice of police as well as family incidents and missing persons. It also includes details on locationsandpersons involved. LEAP is a dynamic case management and data storage database designed primarily for operational policing purposes. Victoria Police update existing records with new information as it becomes available, and revise records when investigation identifies additional information. The Central Data Entry Bureau of Victoria Police also amends records when quality control checks identify inaccurate or incomplete information. The only problem is that LEAP is an outdated and inefficient ‘green-screen’ system developed in1992.

Background of the project

Over350,000datarecordswereretrievedfromLEAPeverydaybyoperationalmembers.Sinceits conception,numerousinterfaceshavebeendevelopedtosupporttheexchangeofdatabetweenLEAPandotherVictoriaPolicesystemsandotherorganisationssuchasAustralianFederalPolice,VicRoadsandtheDepartmentofJustice,makingthisaverycomplexsystemtobereplaced.

LEAP operated on obsolete mainframe technology and was driven by a ‘green screen’ presentationrequiringkeyedentriesratherthanagraphicpresentation.LEAPisout-datedinstyle, functionalityandoperability.Itsdatawas‘captured’byelectronicdatarecording(forsomecrimes) and the use of voluminous forms completed by police and faxed to a central data entry bureau (approximately1200perday)wherefulltimedataentrystaff(75)workaroundtheclockkeying

information into the LEAP system. The backlog was such that it may take days for important crime information to become visible to other police. The system was burdensome and inefficient.MaintenanceoftheLEAPsystemwasalsotimeconsumingandcostly.

In2005,afterembarrassingleaksfromLEAPcreatedpublicconcernastothesystem’sefficacy, the Office of Police Integrity recommended the replacement of LEAP with a force wide computer-basedinformationsystem.InanattempttofullyreplacetheLEAPdatabase,theLink projectwastheninitiatedbytheVictoriaPolice.

In August 2005, the then Premier announced $50 million funding for the replacement of LEAP, to be rolled out over three years. At the time of the announcement of the funding for the LEAP replacement no business case had been prepared. It was appreciated by the then Chief Commissioner that $50 million was insufficient for the project but her view was that the funding should be viewed as “… a bird in the hand versus two in the bush”. The Executive Director, Infrastructure and Information Technology of the Victoria Police, Mr Michael Vanderheide observed on his arrival at Victoria Police that it was thought acceptable for an IT project to run over budget with no accountability. Later in 2005 the funding for the replacement of LEAP was increased to $60.5 million.

The Business Case

TheBusinessInformationandTechnologyandServicesdepartment(BITS)–laterrestructuredto the Infrastructure and Information Technology (I&IT) department of Victoria Police–was established in 2005 to centralise major IT account management, business management and projectimplementationacrossVictoriaPolice.TheChiefInformationOfficer(CIO),responsible forBITSformuchofthistime,heldapositionatequivalentleveltoaDeputyCommissionerand was one of the 26 direct reports to Chief Commissioner Nixon, which advised the Minister of Police.

Victoria Police engaged consultants to prepare, in a very short time, a business case (BC) to completelyreplacetheLEAPsystem.ThisBCwaspreparedanddeliveredinFebruary2006,which indicated the project would cost $59.48 million over four years, as opposed to the government’s commitment of $60.5 million. As part of the BC, the project objectives indicated that the replacementwould:

reducecrimeandimprovecommunitytrust;
upgradepoliceskillsinethicalmanagementanddatasensitivity;
gather better information anddata;
streamline data entry;and
improve security of police data andaccess.

The business case was the subject of a meeting for ‘clarification’ between the consultants and representatives of Victoria Police on 4 September 2006. The notes of the meeting revealed that the business case was written to fit the budget and for the writing of suitable messages to confirm that support. It was noted at this meeting that the business case was not a like-for-like replacement, that the business case didn’t address key existing issues with LEAP and that the benefits as outlined in the business case were extremely broad, largely unachievable and unmeasurable. A major risk to the project that escaped proper scrutiny in the business case was the difficulty and cost of incorporating into the new system the many IT interfacesdevelopedtoworkinconjunctionwithLEAP.

On30May2007,thesteeringcommitteeacceptedtheFebruary2006businesscasesubjecttoa number of caveatsincluding:

that the adequacy of funding would not be ascertained until more information became availableastowhetherthereplacementsystemwouldbecustombuiltorcommercialoff theshelf.
thescopeoftheLEAPreplacementhadnotbeenspecifiedindetailwithinthebusiness caseandtheexactscopeoftheprojectcouldnotbeconfirmed.

The caveats demonstrated the inadequacy of the initial business case. Not even the scope of the replacementprojectwasknown.Thebusinesscasewasnotupdatedatallduringtheproject.The absence of a business case updated with key aspects of project change (i.e. budget, schedule, scope, risks and contingencies) meant the steering committee remained ignorant of the true net present value of the project for approximately fouryears.

The business case also failed to identify measurable benefits to be achieved by the project. VictoriaPolicenotesfromameetingwiththeconsultantinSeptember2006indicated‘manyof thebenefitsarenotmeasurablebutwerewrittentoconfirmgovernmentsupport’.Forexample, the business case stated that the project would lead to a reduction in crime of five per cent. However, the consultant later stated this was a ‘big statement’, ‘pretty rough’ and ‘never measurable’.

Procurement & Like-for-like¹implementation strategy

After a procurement process, Victoria Police entered into a contract with Canadian vendor Niche Technologies in February 2009 to provide a commercial off-the-shelf²records management system, the Niche Records Management System product, which had been successfully

IntermsoftheinformationstoredandthecollectionmethodtherewouldbeverylittlechangebetweenLEAPasitcurrentlyoperatesandLINK.Itwas

determined that a ‘like-for-like’ approach would create the smallest scope and make specification more straight-forward.

Aproductthatalreadyexistsandcanbereadilyprocured.Suchproductsaregenerallycheaperandlessriskythandevelopinganew,untestedsystem.

implemented by police in many other jurisdictions both in Australia and overseas. Victoria Police also purchased an Enterprise Service Bus (ESB), which would provide a mechanism for the new system and other applications that interface with LEAP (such as the VicRoads database) to exchange information.

However, agencies appear reluctant to acquire and make the most of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems. This was no different for the Link project. A COTS system was purchased but over 100 changes were made to the base package, which was customised to make it look and feel like the existing LEAP system. By following this approach, Victoria Police would have its own version of the COTS system, which could create difficulties in maintaining the system through standard upgrades.

ThebusinesscaseacceptedinMay2007didnotcontemplatealike-for-likereplacementofLEAP as it stated that “replace LEAP on a like-for-like basis using modern technologies and architecturewouldignorethemajorchangesinpolicerolesandpracticesthathaveoccurredand are likely to occur in the future”. At some point, however, during the procurement process a decisionwastakenthatrequiredthereplacementofLEAP“…inallitscurrentfunctionality”.The effect of the decision was to seek a custom built like-for-like solution, which reproduced the functionalityofLEAP.Thedecisionwasatoddswiththeoriginal businesscaseandwasatno stage properly costed, despite the caveat to the business case mentioned in the steering committeeminutesof30May2007.

The ‘like-for-like’ strategy resulted in the commercial off-the-shelf product being excessively customised, eroding the inherent benefits offered by the LEAP replacement product and increasing costs. More so, this type of system had not been implemented as a ‘like-for-like’ replacementbeforeandthevendorindicatedtoVictoriaPolicethatthevolumeandcomplexity of implementing a ‘like-for-like’ replacement would be the largest development effort it had undertaken.ThethenExecutiveDirector,InformationTechnology,VictoriaPolicestatedthatthe ‘like-for-like’ approach did not cause the project’s problems, but the approach ‘turned into a mistake’andresultedina‘hugeopportunityloss’.

Theexecutivesponsorandchairofthesteeringcommitteestatedthatoneofthelearningsfrom theprojectwasthatVictoriaPoliceshouldhavere-engineereditsbusinessprocessestofitthe newsystem,ratherthantryingtomakethesystemfitVictoriaPolice’sprocesses.Thereluctance tochangebusinessprocessesappearstobedrivenbyadesirenottoinconvenienceusers,even intheshortterm,byachangeinapproachorthelookandfeeloftheproduct.Theapproachis alsoseentoreducetrainingandchangemanagementcosts.

Yet,thelike-for-likeapproachcanleadtoincreasedprojectcostsandfailuretocapitaliseonthe advancements in technology since the old system was developed. An over-emphasis on replicationofexistingprocessescanresultinlostopportunitiesintermsofmakingchangesto improveprocesses,makingthemostofwhatthesystemitself–particularlythebenefitsoffered byCOTSsystems–hastoofferandminimisingimmediateandoptimisingongoingdevelopment costs.Ofcourse,itisinevitablewhendevelopingandimplementingnewICT-enabledsystems that changes to proven products will be necessary to meet the requirements of the agency.Nevertheless,itisessentialwhenconsideringandimplementingthesechangesthatthe risksareclearlyidentifiedandarticulatedandstrategiesareputinplacetomitigateoratleast minimise thoserisks.

Timeline

Costs & Funding

The Link business case was developed to fit within the funding already announced by the Government-$60.5million.Thesteeringcommitteeobservedthisbudgetwasasimplificationof thetruebudgetcashflowandthatthebudgetwouldneedtoberevisedwhenpostprocurement planning was complete and revised again after the development of a detailed work plan in conjunctionwiththesuccessfulvendor.InMarch2009,despitehavingenteredacontractwith Niche just a month before, the scope of the work required for implementation remained to be settled, without any apparent basis the steering committee was advised “… the total project budgetisnotexpectedtochange”.

Yearslateritwasidentifiedthatthefundingwasinsufficient.Therewerenumerousbudget issuesrelatingtotheLINKprojectnotallowedforincostingtheproject,including:

interface development (including amount for contingency) to cost $30 million (in additiontothe$15.7millionspentfortheEnterpriseServiceBus(ESB),softwarethat

provided the platform for interface processing) against the original business case estimate of $2.4 million for interface costs;

dataconversionfromLEAPtoLINKover$10million;
trainingcostswereunderestimatedbyasmuchas$25million;and
extracostsduetotheneedtoextendthetimeframefordeployment.

Itwasnotuntillate2009thattheprojectteamrealisedthebusinesscasecostestimateswere significantlydeficientandinMarch2010,theteamidentifiedtheprojectwas$80millionunder- funded.Bythistime,theprojecthadbeenrunningforalmostfouryears.Whilesomecostsmay not have been identifiable until after a vendor was selected, the requirement for additional fundingshouldhavebeenidentifiedmuchearlierbytheprojectteam.Therewereseveralearly warningsignswhichshouldhavecausedtheprojectteamtoreviewthebusinesscase:

The consultant had advised that the scope of the business case was written to fit the budget, rather than a bottom-up requirements analysis of the system, and it was written over a short period of time (September2006)
Concernswereraisedabouttheadequacyoffundingfortheproject(December2006 andMarch2008).GatewayReviews³recommendedthesteeringcommittee‘finalise scopeandbudgetadequacy’.Aspartofthesereviews,suggestionsweremadethatthe projectbudgetcould‘bevalidatedonreceiptoftenderresponses’.
ThesteeringcommitteedidnotendorsethebusinesscaseuntilMay2007.Eventhen,its endorsement was qualified by stating that the adequacy of funding could not be ascertaineduntilmoreinformationwasavailableonthecostofareplacementsystem; and that the scope of LEAP replacement had not been specified in detail within the businesscase.
2008mediareports(priortoVictoriaPolicesigningacontractwiththevendor)indicated theQueenslandpoliceforcespenttwiceasmuchastheLinkbudgetimplementingthe samesystem.

Thereappearstohavebeenalackofleadershipinthatoncetheprojectstarted,therewasno stoppingit–despiteclearlyinadequatefunding.

Project Management

Victoria Police did not appoint a single project manager to lead the project, instead appointing a Business Project Manager (a sworn officer) and a Technical Project Manager with joint responsibility.

TheGatewayReviewprocessisaninitiativeoftheDepartmentofTreasuryandFinancetoprovideanindependentreviewofprocurementatakeydecision point.

OneswornofficerfulfilledtheroleofBusinessProjectManagerfromthebeginningof2008until project closure. While he had policing experience and knowledge of the business, he had not managedalarge,complexICT-enabledprojectbefore.Hesaidhe‘attendedthebasic‘Prince2’ Projectmanagementcourseineither2006or2007’andbelievedhewasselectedfortheposition ashehad‘successfullyimplemented’amulti-agencyprojectinvolvingVictoriaPolice.

Victoria Police’s appointment of the officer to such a significant role suggests a failure to understand the need for the project manager to have project management experience and preferably, experience with projects of the size and complexity of the project. In fact, project managementwasidentifiedasaprojectriskinthe2006businesscase,whichstated,‘Inadequate projectmanagementisa…majorcontributortothefactthat60-70%ofITrelatedprojectsfailto deliver’.

The Business Project Manager was also the senior responsible officer (SRO) for the project. The SRO is the project owner, sponsor and champion—with personal accountability and overall responsibility for the delivery of benefits. The SRO also receives the Gateway Review reports. Combining the roles of Project Manager and SRO may have diminished the level of scrutiny on the project.

Additionally, there seems to have a lack of understanding of business processes and old systems by the project team. There was often a lack of documentation or understanding among staff about the old systems, including business rules, the meaning of the data collected and any interfaces with other applications. In the Link project, insufficient planning resulted in a failure by Victoria Police to identify the number and complexity of the existing LEAP interfaces with other applications. The costs associated with interfaces were significantly underestimated. Deputy Commissioner, Kieran Walshe, said that “The integration of old and new technologies is an extremely complex and time-consuming task – there are close to 200 interfaces with 25 existing applications that need to be dealt with as part of the change” and that “unfortunately, the scale and cost of this work was underestimated in the original businesscase.”

‘Tick-the-box’approachtoriskmanagement

While the Link project had a risk register and risk was generally a standing agenda item for steeringcommitteemeetings,insufficientattentionwasactuallygiventomanagingormitigating risks.Rather,VictoriaPoliceappeartohaveapproachedriskmanagementwitha‘tick-the-box’ mentality–thatis,theriskregisterisinplace,riskisontheagendaandthisissufficient.Thisis particularlyconcerninggiventhehigh-risknatureofICT-enabledprojects.

The risk register, like the business case, must be a living document, which is regularly reviewed throughout the project to ensure risks–new and existing–are managed.

In the Link Project detailed specific risks in its risk register, but failed to manage them throughout the project. In this regard, In December 2007, a risk chart was developed for the ‘LINK’ (LEAP replacement) project. The risk chart was subject of numerous iterations up until 2010 but some ‘high’ risks were not addressed. The March 2008 Link risk register included a high risk that the level of effort required for systems integration (ensuring that Link and other applications could communicate) could be greater than expected. However, it was not until late 2009 that the projectteamexaminedindetailthelevelofintegrationneeded.

The Link business case also identified project management as a project risk and a major contributortothefailureof60-70percentofICT-enabledprojects.Despitethis,VictoriaPolice failedtoappointasingle,qualifiedprojectmanagertoruntheproject.

There was no proper analysis of risks which underscores the lack of project management experience on the steering committee. The risk management plan in reality was not used to manage risk, and it quickly became out of date. For example, it was not updated to reflect the risk of cost overrun posed by the lack of any proper costing of the like-for-like decision.

Assumptions and Reflection

TheprojectisnotyetsuspendedandyouhavebeengiventheresponsibilityofanexternalProjectManagementconsultanttocomeinandproposeoptionstorecovertheproject.

→What could be fixed from what has been done before?

→What are the uncertainties that still surround the project moving forward?

References:

Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013). LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (LEAP)VICTORIA POLICE. Retrieved from:https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/4533.0main+features100062013

Brouwer, G. E. (November, 2011). Own motion investigation into ICT-enabled projects–In consultation with the Victorian Auditor-General. OMBUDSMAN.

Herrick,C.(April,2011).VicPolicedatabaseprojectfaces$100millionblowout.ComputerWorld. Retrieved from:https://www.computerworld.com/article/3485553/vic-police-database-project-faces-100-million-blowout.html

StateServicesAuthority(November,2011)Inquiryintothecommand,managementandfunctions oftheseniorstructureofVictoriaPolice.StateGovernmentofVictoriaStateServicesAuthority.

VAGO (September, 2018). Crime Data. Victorian Auditor-General’s Office. Retrieved from:

https://www.audit.vic.gov.au/report/crime-data?section=

*Howtocitethis:TorrensUniversityAustralia(2020).LinkProjectCaseStudy.PROJ6003Project Execution & Control: Assessment CaseStudy.