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The taxonomy

Describe the taxonomy of different types of counterfeits. 1. Explain how IP overuse and IP piracy may take place. Provide respective examples. 2. Why do overproduced ICs cost less than their original counterpart? 3. Why does using out-of-spec chips pose a threat? 4. Why are Trojans inserted by the foundry difficult to detect? 5. What […]

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Modern electronic hardware

Describe the lifecycle of a modern electronic hardware / ASIC design. 1. Classify the attacks on hardware IPs in terms of the attacker’s origin and intent. Briefly describe possible attack instances of hardware Trojan and IC overproduction. 2. How can an IP be exploited via reverse engineering? Briefly explain potential attack instances of reverse engineering.

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Digital Right Management

In the high level block diagram of a PCB used in a TV set top box the Digital Right Management (DRM) key is stored in a non-volatile memory (NVM) which goes to a comparator that generates the channel grant access signal. Describe a possible tampering attack that can bypass this protection. You can update the

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Engineering

Only untrusted design houses are vulnerable to PCB attacks. 1. Trusted design houses are not susceptible to malicious attacks. 2. Modchip attacks are prevalent in gaming consoles. 3. PCB reverse engineering requires industry-grade equipment and expertise. 4. It is comparatively easier to find a Trojan in multilayer PCBs.

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Untrusted design houses

Describe a potential attack instance when the design house is trusted in the PCB manufacturing process. Illustrate the scenario with an appropriate case study. 1. What would be an attack instance on PCBs manufactured in untrusted design houses? Describe with a relevant case study. 2. What are the possible attacks on PCBs? Explain the taxonomy

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Security primitives

Briefly discuss the major characteristic differences between PUFs, TRNGs, and DfACs. 1. Briefly discuss the quality metrics used to evaluate PUFs and TRNGs. 2. Explain why RO-PUFs tend to produce more erroneous responses due to runtime noise and aging compared to traditional arbiter-PUFs. 3. Briefly describe what security primitives (strong PUFs, weak PUFs, or TRNGs)

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Entropy

Ideally, PUFs should have 50% intra-Hamming distance. Ideally, TRNGs should have 50% intra-Hamming distance. Frequency injection attack on an oscillator-based TRNG reduces the throughput, but entropy remains the same.

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Power supply noise

Depending on the startup behavior, the SRAM-array can be used both as a PUF and a TRNG. 1. Runtime variation (such as power supply noise and Vdd fluctuations) is good for PUFs, but unacceptable for TRNGs. 2. DfAC structures, such as CDIR sensors, utilize aging phenomena for detecting prior usages of the IC.

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